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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY IN TORT-PROSPECTIVE JUDICIAL
ABROGATION OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CONCEPT-Plaintiff's decedent
was killed by a fall down the elevator shaft of a building owned and maintained by the City of Detroit. Plaintiff alleged that defendant city negligently failed to protect and enclose the shaft, in violation of its own
ordinances, and that such failure was the proximate cause of her husband's
death. The city moved to dismiss, claiming that it was engaged in a governmental function and therefore was immune from tort liability. On appeal
from an order dismissing the complaint, held, affirmed by an evenly divided
court. However, a majority of the court prospectively overruled the judicial doctrine of governmental immunity from ordinary torts. Williams v.
City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
The principal case is representative of a growing trend on the part of
state courts and legislatures to reach a new compromise between the
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common-law concept of sovereign immunity1 and the belief that the risk
of wrongful injury should not be borne by the individual but by society
as a whole.2 Interaction of these conflicting views has placed the law of
sovereign immunity in a state of confusion, for while some jurisdictions
rigidly adhere to the immunity rule, others have made inroads upon it
through piecemeal imposition of liability. Many courts, for example, have
in recent years liberally construed legislative enactments empowering
specific governmental bodies "to sue and be sued."3 Whereas formerly
these provisions had been interpreted to waive immunity of the sovereign
only from suit and not liability,4 now immunity from liability is also held
to have been waived. 5 Judicial attempts have also been made to distinguish
those functions in which the municipal body is acting in a governmental
capacity from those in which its activities are proprietary in nature, and
as such are not granted sovereign immunity.6 However, no satisfactory
criteria for the distinction have been devised other than vague and general
guides,7 and, as has been suggested,8 the outcome desired in a particular
case often influences the classification employed. Another distinction has
been that made between contract and tort actions, on the theory that an
award of contract damages indirectly benefits the governmental body by
encouraging persons to contract with it, while a tort recovery yields no
1 Russel v. Men of Devon, 2 Durn. &: East. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). See
also Leflar &: Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1363 (1954).
2 See Fuller &: Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REv. 437
(1941).
3 Linger v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 158 F. Supp. 900 (\V.D. Pa. 1958) ;
Lowes v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 125 F. Supp. 681 (M.D. Pa. 1954); Sayreville
v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 67 N.J. Super. 271, 170 A.2d 523 (1961). See also
Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1222 (1958) .
4 Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 254 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1958);
Spangler v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 106 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1958) ; Elizabeth
River Tunnel Dist. v. Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 117 S.E.2d 685 (1961); Wilson v. State
Highway Comm'r, 174 Va. 82, 4 S.E.2d 746 (1939).
5 E.g., St. Julian v. State, 82 So. 2d 85 (La. Ct. App. 1955) ; Ouzts v. State Highway
Dep't, 161 S.C. 21, 159 S.E. 457 (1931) .
6 Bettencourt v. State, 123 Cal. App. 2d 60, 266 P .2d 201 (1954) ; People v. Superior
Court, 168 P.2d 177 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946), peremptory writ of prohibition denied,
29 Cal. 2d 754, 178 P.2d 1 (1947); Martinson v. City of Alpena, 328 Mich. 595, 44 N.W.2d
148 (1950); Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956);
Gotcher v. State, 106 S.W.2d 1104 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1937) .
7 Daszkiewicz v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 301 Mich. 212, 3 N .W.2d 71 (1942) • See
generally Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort
Liability, 9 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 214 (1942). In 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 29.6, at
1621 (1956) , the following is submitted as a test for distinguishing governmental from
proprietary functions: " (1) whether the function is allocated to the municipality for
its profit or special advantage or whether for the purpose of carrying out the public
functions of the state without advantage to the city, and (2) whether the function is
one historically performed by government."
8 See Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. REv. 41, 43 (1949) .
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such "advantage." 9 A "nuisance" theory,10 and an "active wrongdoing"
test11 have also carved out limited exceptions to the sovereign immunity
rule.
But the principal case and similar decisions in Illinois,12 California,13
and Florida14 have attempted to lay aside these multifarious distinctions
in favor of a judicial abrogation of the ancient common law immunity
rule. In so doing, new problems are posed, problems not encountered under
a rule of immunity. Perhaps the most significant of these is the question
of what limits, if any, should be placed upon the liability of the formerly
immune sovereign and its subordinates. The holding in the principal
case has extended liability, unlimited in amount, not only to the City of
Detroit, but to every municipal corporation in Michigan regardless of size.
From what appears, it is conceivable that governmental bodies may also
be held accountable for the intentional torts of their employees and agents.
In short, even though the decision expressly exempts from liability discretionary governmental functions, many of the other traditional safeguards on liability have been abandoned despite the fact that experience
indicates some restraint is required for the protection of public funds,
especially those of the smaller community. 15 In addition, the increased
liability may necessitate the establishment of appropriate administrative
facilities or perhaps an independent tribunal to administer liability claims
effectively. Without a resolution of these problems it will be difficult for
the broad liability rule to serve as a practicable solution. Thus, a reaction
from the legislature or the judiciary is likely to follow which will either
implement the rule and supply the necessary safeguards, or restore the
o Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690, 38 Pac. 457 (1894) ; Bush v. State Highway Comm'n,
329 Mo. 843, 46 S.W.2d 854 (1932) ; Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Comm'n, 95
Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937).
10 See Capozzi v. Waterbury, 115 Conn. 107, 160 Atl. 435 (1932); Windle v. City of
Springfield, 320 Mo. 459, 8 S.W.2d 61 (1928); Oklahoma City v. Tytenicz, 171 Okla.
519, 43 P.2d 747 (1935).
11 Casale v. Housing Authority, 42 N.J. Super. 52, 125 A.2d 895 (1956). See also
Repko, supra note 7, at 223.
12 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) •
13 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 2II, 359 P .2d 457 (1961) .
14 Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) • See also Annot.,
60 A.L.R.2d II93 (1958) .
11! See Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform,
20 A.B.A.J. 747 (1934) . Opponents of the immunity rule, however, contend that liability
insurance affords at a fixed, predictable cost both protection from overwhelming liability
and the insurer's services in defending suits against the governmental entity. See Gibbons,
Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State and Local Government, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 588. See also Leflar &: Kantrowitz, supra note 1, at 1413. Support for this view is
evidenced by the fact that statutes in some states expressly waive governmental immunity
to the extent that such liability is within the coverage of a policy of insurance. E.g.,
Ford v. City of Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 321 P .2d 589 (1958) ; Villars v. City of Portsmouth,
100 N.H. 453, 129 A.2d 914 (1957); Rogers v. Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W.2d 414 (1936).
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immunity doctrine; for such has been the experience in all three of the
states whose judiciaries purported to establish a broad rule of liability.
In subsequent decisions, the courts themselves proved reluctant to give
full force and effect to their prior decisions. The Florida court refused to
extend liability beyond the scope of its original decision,10 which abolished
only municipal immunity, leaving the state and its agencies immune as
before except where liability was imposed by statute.17 Nor would the
Florida court extend liability to render municipal corporations accountable
for the intentional torts of their employees. 18 In California, the decision
purportedly overruling sovereign immunity19 was subsequently limited to
apply only to the torts of agents who acted in a ministerial capacity.20
So also in Michigan, the ruling of the principal case was later held to
withdraw immunity only from municipal corporations.21
Although the judiciary may work to temper the liability rule, a comprehensive solution cannot be reached without appropriate legislative
implementation. For the judiciary lacks the facilities for an examination
of the social, economic and political considerations which delineate the
outer limits of liability. Nor can the judiciary provide for uniform administrative facilities and procedures, maximum amounts of recovery, the
creation of a liability fund, or other provisions which the added liability
may prove desirable.22 These are properly legislative functions. So also,
authorization for the procurement of liability insurance, now a practical
necessity for the smaller community with a narrow tax base, is a matter
usually reserved to the legislature.23 These considerations led the California legislature to re-enact the doctrine of governmental immunity from
tort liability as a rule of decision in order to allow itself time to draft appropriate legislation and define certain areas in which immunity would
continue to exist. 24 So also in Illinois, a Torts Law Commission was created2 ;;
to recommend legislative change where necessary, and to consider the
compilation in one code of all laws pertaining to governmental tort liaHargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
Moreno v. Aldrich, 113 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
18 Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 113 So. 2d 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) •
19 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
20 Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465 (1961).
21 McDowell v. Mackie, 365 Mich. 268, 112 N.W.2d 491 (1961) •
22 See Justice Schauer's dissenting opinion in Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.
2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
23 Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 338 P .2d 808 (Wyo. 1959) .
24 CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.3.
25 Ill. Laws 1961, S. Bill No. 229. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, § 301.l; ch. 57\/2,
§ 3a; ch. 105, §§ 12.1-1, 333.2a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961), where immunity was reinstated
by legislative enactment to counties and certain park and forest preserve districts.
16
17
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bility. Such action exemplifies the special capacity of the legislature
specifically to define and condition the terms of liability.26
The model example of such combined legislative and judicial action
achieving a significant abrogation of immunity is that set by New York,
which in 1929 adopted a Court of Claims Act abolishing sovereign immunity from both suit and liability, and establishing a Court of Claims to
hear and determine all claims against the state.2 7 Such rule has been refined
by subsequent legislative enactments and judicial interpretation28 over a
period of thirty years to provide a comprehensive pattern of tort liability.29
The lesson to be drawn from the New York solution is that it will be
difficult for the doctrine advanced in the principal case to realize fruition
unaltered by subsequent judicial refinement and legislative implementation.30 However, the court, having taken action in an area often thought
to be one of legislative prerogative,31 does impel legislative consideration
of the problem of sovereign immunity in a new light. In doing so, it poses
a challenge to the legislature to provide the necessary safeguards and a
suitable procedural framework for the administration of tort liability,32 a
challenge now, more than ever, likely to evoke response by way of legislative action, as those interests which formerly enjoyed immunity and opposed
the imposition of complete tort liability will undoubtedly be more receptive
to legislation intended to strike a compromise.
Donald E. Vacin

.26 Strauss v. Decatur Park Dist., 177 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ill. 1959); Miller v. City of
Chicago, 25 Ill. App. 2d 56, 165 N.E.2d 724 (1960); Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262
Wis. 219, 55 N.W.2d 24 (1952).
27 N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8. See also Vt. Laws 1961, S. Bill No. 124, by which Vermont
enacted a statutory scheme of similar import•
.28 New York courts have held that this statute swept away the derivative immunity
of the state's political subdivisions in Holmes v. County of Erie, 266 App. Div. 220, 42
N.Y.S.2d 243 (1943), aff'd, 291 N.Y. 798, 53 N.E.2d 369 (1944); and of municipalities in
Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
20 Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 5 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
See also Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability in New York, A Legislative Challenge, 23
N.Y.U.L. REv. 278 (1948) •
30 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 53051; CAL. VEHICLE CoDE § 17001; ILL. STAT. ANN.
ch. 24, §§ 1-13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961) ; N.Y. MuNic. LAw § 50a; OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 701.02 (Page 1953) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.06 (Supp. 1961).
31 See Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d 687 (1961);
Banas v. City of Syracuse, 204 Misc. 201, 125 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. 1953) .
32 See Borchard, supra note 15.

